Japan's Conspiracy (4) |
Reference List 070
From rackets to real estate, yakuza multifaceted
Feb. 14, 2007
The yakuza have long played a powerful, if often unseen, role in society. Romanticized in literature and film as noble outcasts replete with punch-perms, extensive tattoos and severed pinkies, the underworld is one of archaic language and secretive rituals and customs as well as extreme violence and intimidation.
The introduction of antigang laws in 1993, however, has made it tougher for the yakuza (known in legal terminology as "boryoku-dan") to operate as openly as they once did. Nevertheless, through legitimate businesses and ever more sophisticated extortion methods, the mob continues to thrive.
Though it has now subsided, a recent war in Tokyo between the two largest crime syndicates -- the Yamaguchi-gumi and Sumiyoshi-kai -- has returned the yakuza to the spotlight. Following are some basic facts about these organized crime gangs:
How many yakuza are there?
The exact number of yakuza is unknown. Police estimate there are 40,000, but unofficial counts by experts tally as many as 80,000. The National Police Agency designates 21 yakuza organizations as violent gangs, but they are not the total number -- merely those designated as the most dangerous.
Which are the biggest mob syndicates?
The Kobe-based Yamaguchi-gumi, with 20,000 registered members and perhaps another unofficial 20,000, is the largest and strongest syndicate.
Consisting of 99 directly affiliated gangs, the Yamaguchi-gumi has been led since August 2005 by Kenichi Shimoda, alias Shinobu Tsukasa, who also heads the Aichi Prefecture-based Kodo-kai.
In late 2005, Shimoda began serving a six-year prison term on a firearms violation, and the de facto head of the gang is now said to be Kiyoshi Takayama, Shimoda's most trusted lieutenant and another Kodo-kai member.
In Tokyo, the 5,000-member Inagawa-kai and 6,000-member Sumiyoshi-kai are the largest gangs. Traditionally, the Yamaguchi-gumi and the two Tokyo gangs have been bitter rivals, and gang wars have left scores of mobsters and innocent bystanders dead or wounded.
What exactly do yakuza do or control?
Like the underworld elsewhere, the yakuza are deeply involved in prostitution, hostess clubs, gambling and drugs, and specifically in Japan's case, narcotics from North Korea and China. But they also run legitimate businesses in real estate and construction, as well as pachinko parlors and talent agencies. Their presence is also strong in the pornographic film industry and borderline-legitimate "entertainment" ventures like "soapland" brothels.
The more sophisticated yakuza play the stock market or extort funds from large companies through a variety of seemingly legitimate schemes. There are also the "sokaiya" -- stockholding mobsters who threaten to disrupt shareholders' meetings by revealing company secrets. Many blue-ribbon corporations have been caught paying off sokaiya over the years.
Police have identified over a dozen routine yakuza extortion scams that they regularly warn the public about, ranging from forcing businesses to subscribe to yakuza-produced magazines, buy flowers and plants for their offices from yakuza-run firms, or purchase blocks of tickets to dubious parties or performances by mob-connected entertainers.
But this is just small-time stuff, isn't it? Don't yakuza have a larger and deeper influence?
From the prewar period until well into the 1990s, yakuza influence on politicians and major corporations was unquestioned. Yakuza members served as strike-breakers after the war, battling communists and unions.
They also helped organize, with government support, counterdemonstrations to protests that occurred in 1960 against the extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
Over the years, scores of top politicians and major business leaders with yakuza ties have been arrested for their dealings with the mob, and they remain influential at the local level.
Mitsuhiro Suganuma, a former Public Security Intelligence Agency official whose job was to keep track of the yakuza, told foreign journalists in Tokyo last October that Chubu International Airport near Nagoya and the Aichi Expo, both of which opened in 2005, could never have been realized without local yakuza approval and cooperation.
Aichi police and Chubu-based journalists have repeatedly said in tabloid magazine interviews that they believe one of the major reasons Kodo-kai leaders took the helm of the Yamaguchi-gumi, which has traditionally chosen its top people from the Kansai region and western Japan, was because the Kodo-kai is, thanks to the more prosperous Chubu economy, the wealthiest gang in the syndicate.
So just how much money do the yakuza control?
Based on police statistics, economist Takashi Kadokura, who has written two books analyzing Japan's underground economy, estimates that in 2004 the yakuza's illegal income was between 1.07 trillion yen and 1.6 trillion yen. The amount the yakuza receive through legal means is unknown.
What's the difference between the yakuza and the rightwing?
While cynics say "not much," there are differences. Many yakuza are Korean or Chinese residents of Japan or hail from the "buraku" communities, Japan's traditional, but technically former, outcasts. For this reason, they deplore the xenophobic and racist attitudes of the rightwing movement.
One such reported Yamaguchi-gumi-linked mobster of Korean descent, Hiroyuki Jo, made headlines in April 1995 in a scene reminiscent of Jack Ruby in Dallas in 1963. Jo, due to his "outrage" over Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack on Tokyo's subway system, fatally stabbed the cult's science chief, Hideo Murai, in front of a swarm of reporters. Tabloids reported that Jo actually wanted to silence Murai before he could reveal how the sect had been making narcotics and guns for the mob.
Other gangsters, especially Kansai yakuza who prefer business to politics, view the rightwingers as fanatics unable to respect those whose views differ from their own -- bad business partners, in other words.
Freelance journalist Manabu Miyazaki, the son of a Kyoto yakuza leader, has written that his father admired the communists for their defense of ordinary workers, if not for their views on capitalism.
The late Tokutaro Takayama, who headed the Kyoto-based Aizu Kotetsu-kai and was a Korean national by birth, once told The Japan Times that, unlike many rightwingers, yakuza understood the racial discrimination suffered by resident Koreans.
How have things changed since the antigang laws came into effect?
The two big changes are (1) the yakuza have adopted a much lower public profile; and (2) police and the yakuza do not exchange information as they once did.
Yakuza writers and apologists partly blame the rise in crimes committed by foreign gangs that have set up in Japan since the early 1990s on the lack of behind-the-scenes information exchanges between yakuza and police.
Why are yakuza still tolerated in this day and age?
There remains a widespread belief, especially among older Japanese, that despite their occasional violence, the yakuza serve two useful purposes as a "necessary evil."
The first is to engage in businesses that cater to basic human needs in a way that respects the harmony of society far less than would otherwise be the case if the yakuza did not exist. The second reason is a belief that the yakuza provide order, discipline and self-esteem to those individuals who would cause even more trouble if they were not yakuza.
Breaking the yakuza's grip
Japan Times Feb. 25, 2001
LONDON -- The sad case of the murder of Lucy Blackman, the young British woman who was a hostess in a Roppongi bar, inevitably attracted the attention of the British media.
The gist of press reporting was that, if it had not been for the tireless efforts of Lucy's father, who visited Japan on a number of occasions and invoked an intervention by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the police would have shelved their investigations.
The nature of the Roppongi bars and their role in the "water trade" in Japan have inevitably been exposed, reports the press. Lucy's father was clearly horrified by what he saw in Roppongi. He found the bars sordid and questions have been asked about their safety in terms of fire and health hazards. It has been suggested that the bars are only able to continue in their current fashion because many are controlled by yakuza groups.
If this were not the case, the popular press argued, than surely the police and the immigration officers would be conducting frequent raids to detect and deport illegal immigrants or those on tourist visas who have overstayed the terms under which they were admitted to Japan.
Newspapers have noted the connections between yakuza groups and prominent Japanese politicians and the influence they exercise over property companies and construction firms. The media recognized that the women involved in this trade were there because the wages were good but noted the high costs of living as a foreigner in Japan.
In Lucy Blackman's case, it has been reported that she owed large sums on her credit card and had gone to Japan to make some money quickly. The media also recognized that the nature of the job should have been obvious to all but the most innocent, but asked whether the apparent exploitation should have been accepted by the Japanese authorities.
The Japanese authorities and especially the police will no doubt argue that this kind of reporting is both incorrect and unfair. Perhaps it is. The media does have a natural propensity to exaggerate and sensationalize news stories. The Japanese police will also no doubt argue correctly that they can only act on adequate evidence and they cannot just arrest people on suspicion. They cannot force people to give evidence when they may incriminate themselves. They do not have the resources to provide police protection for all those who might be threatened by unidentifiable gangsters.
Nevertheless there do seem to be reasonable grounds for some of the criticisms leveled against the handling of this and related cases. In particular it seems extraordinary to many that the bar in which Lucy worked has been able to reopen, admittedly under a new name.
It also seems odd that in a country with such a strict immigration policy as Japan's, women who are in Japan illegally are not at least warned and if they continue to stay on, deported. Japanese health and safety regulations are supposed to be strict, but do not seem to have been adequately enforced in the bars in Roppongi and other districts.
The evidence of yakuza connections with politicians and shady businessmen in the construction and property sectors does seem to have some substance.
There seems little doubt that the yakuza have had close connections with the "sokaiya" (racketeers). Some sokaiya activities were exposed by high profile cases in the recent past. There have been no similar reports recently, but it is reasonable to ask whether this is because the sokaiya have ceased to operate or whether it is because they have adopted quieter and more covert methods. It seems doubtful to many outside observers that these crooks can be eradicated until there are significant reforms in Japanese corporate governance.
There have been too many reports recently of corruption in political circles. Where there is corruption the yakuza are likely to be involved. Observers are asking whether the KSD scandal is just the tip of an iceberg. Until Japan adopts and enforces laws to ensure transparency in relation to political donations suspicions will inevitably grow.
I am sometimes asked whether the yakuza play as important a part in Japanese public life as the Mafia does in Sicily and parts of Italy. I doubt this but I would like to see an independent and thorough investigation of the activities of the yakuza and of their connections with politicians and businessmen.
Japan does not seem to have a tradition of appointing a senior judge or judges, with powers to call evidence both oral and written, to undertake investigations of this kind. A properly conducted judicial inquiry in public and open to the media, which exposed the connections and influences exercised by the yakuza, could also usefully be asked to make policy recommendations about effective ways of dealing with the yakuza menace to Japanese society.
Unless there is a proper and full expose of the tentacles of the yakuza, observers are likely to continue to criticize the Japanese authorities for their failure to tackle a serious canker, which could undermine Japanese parliamentary democracy. Japan's reputation as a democratic state, which maintains and protects human rights, is at stake. It is very much a Japanese national interest that Japan should not only have good government, but that the processes should be seen to be unaffected by criminal gangs and corrupt practices.
The fact that there is no precedent for holding such a public inquiry is not a reason why one should not be held. It is always possible to create a precedent, and a courageous minister of justice should raise the issue with his Cabinet colleagues and press it publicly. Japan's judiciary is rightly politically independent, but a public investigation of the kind envisaged would help to reassert its independence and ensure that it becomes an important bastion protecting Japanese society and human rights.
This is a translation of a message on a Japanese message board. The story is amazing. So, I partly translated it into English, though the reliability of the contents is uncertain. But I think that this story is probably true.
I read the web site
Rondan June 7, 2004
I was working for a Japanese major electric company. And for some time I was dispatched to the headquarters of Toyota. I received a painful humiliation by Toyota workers.
First of all, Toyota compels related companies to reduce the price of their supplies. I believe that it is a well-known story. They blatantly say that the associated companies owe a lot of things to Toyota and that they should hand over their profit to Toyota at the sacrifice of other group companies.
Toyota's victims are not only their subcontractors and assembly factories but also their consulting firms, computer companies and financial institutions.
Toyota haggle for bargain as if they were true yakuza. The workers of the company I work for call them yakuza. My company takes no profit through the business with Toyota. I think that other companies suffer similar problems with Toyota.
I believe that Toyota's ten billion dollars of profit is simply the result of the exploitation of other Japanese companies and also the sacrifice of them. I have been amazed by immoral behaviors of Toyota workers.
"Though I greet Toyota workers, they ignore me when they know I am other company's worker or a worker dispatched by another company."I have to think that Toyota is a group of people something like redneck samurai. Particularly, attitude of Toyota workers in Aichi Prefecture, where their actual headquarters are located, is very bad. Toyota's business is something like yakuza's business. I don't think that such a company will prosper for many years.
Mitsubishi Motors has lost prestige because of the recall problems. Some of my friends and some of my relatives are working for Mitsubishi. I also think that this kind of corporations should go into liquidation.
As long as Toyota is a Japanese maker, it cannot be denied that Toyota is hiding problems. I believe that this redneck samurai company will be punished someday.
Heights of politicians
MALARSTWO POLSKIE Surrealizm
Dimitrij Miedwiediew 162-166cm
Nicolas Sarkozy 165-169cm
Silvio Berlusconi 164-171cm
Lech Kaczyński 167-168cm
Wzrost rosyjskich przywódców
Dmitrij Miedwiediew 162 cm do 166 cm
Wladimir Putin 167 -170 cm
Włodzimierz Lenin 164 cm
Józef Stalin 162-164 cm
Nikita Chruszczow 160 – 166 cm
Leonid Breżniew 176 cm
Michaił Gorbaczow 175 cm
Borys Jelcyn 188 cm
Lech Kaczyński 167-168 cm
Jarosław Kaczyński 167 cm
Lech Wałęsa 169 -170cm
Aleksander Kwaśniewski 169- 172 cm
Andrzej Olechowski 198 cm
Ludwik Dorn 188 cm
Adam Lipiński 170 cm
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz 175 cm
Kazimierz Ujazdowski 175 cm
Radosław Sikorski 180-181 cm
Paweł Zalewski 182 cm
Aleksander Szczygło 170 cm
Przemysław Gosiewski 164-167 cm
Zbigniew Ziobro 174 cm
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 176 cm
Marek Borowski 168 cm
Aleksander Kwaśniewski 169- 172 cm
Wojciech Olejniczak 175 cm
Andrzej Lepper 170- 171 cm
Roman Giertych 196 cm
Bronisław Komorowski 174 cm
Donald Tusk 174 cm
Bogdan Zdrojewski 177 cm
Jan Rokita 170 cm
Władysław Stasiak 188 cm
Jarosław Gowin 185 cm
Wzrost amerykańskich prezydentów:
Barack Obama 187 cm
G. W. Bush 182 cm
Bill Clinton 188 cm
Abraham Lincoln 193 cm
Dmitrij Miedwiediew 162 cm do 166 cm
Wladimir Putin 167 -170 cm
Nicolas Sarkozy 165-169 cm
Silvio Berlusconi 164 -171 cm
Angela Merkel 172 cm
Tony Blair 183 cm
Slobodan Milosevic 186 cm
Fidel Castro 191 cm
Jassir Arafat 157 cm
Kim Dzong ll 162 cm
Wzrost innych postaci historycznych:
Napoleon Bonaparte 157-167 cm
Toulouse-Lautrec 150 cm
Kant – 152 cm
Balzak – 157 cm
Wolter- 160 cm
Aso's team digging for 'buried funds'
Japan Times Oct. 23, 2008
With Prime Minister Taro Aso's government and ruling coalition lawmakers busy compiling a second economic stimulus package by the end of this month, the latest political catchphrase has become "Kasumigaseki maizokin," or buried funds in the Kasumigaseki district, the seat of the central government.
The phrase gives the impression there is a mythical buried treasure that can be tapped by the cash-strapped government. But few can explain what it actually is and why it suddenly became the talk of Tokyo.
Following are questions and answers concerning the buried funds:
What are Kasumigaseki maizokin?
They are cash reserves accumulated in 21 special government accounts.
The government has three types of budgets — the general account budget, the special account budget, and the "zaito" fiscal investment and loan programs budget.
The general account budget is used for policy-related expenses, including bond issuance, local government subsidies and social welfare costs, while the zaito budget is used to invest in and extend loans to long-term projects, including road construction.
The special account budget is used for specific government projects, using revenues closely related to that project. For instance, the government uses the gasoline and coal tax to develop new oil and gas fields under a special energy policies account.
Reserves are set aside in each of these 21 special accounts, which amounted to ¥198 trillion as of the end of March.
About ¥138 trillion was reserved for a special account for the nation's pension system, ¥17 trillion for a special account to ensure the stability of the foreign-exchange market and another ¥10 trillion under a special account managing government bonds.
Does that mean the government has ¥198 trillion in financial resources it can use for any purpose?
Not necessarily. The reserves exist for a reason. A large portion is used for pension payments, insurance payments and to repay government bonds.
But politicians claim some of the reserves are too big for their purposes.
When Aso was campaigning for the Liberal Democratic Party presidency, he estimated that about ¥40 trillion of such reserves could be shifted to the general account budget to be used for other purposes.
Politicians are especially targeting the ¥17 trillion zaito special account reserves and another ¥17 trillion in reserves set aside under the foreign-exchange special account.
The zaito special account budget is used to extend long-term fixed interest rate loans to government-affiliated organizations. The reserves are set aside to hedge the risk of future interest rate hikes.
As for the reserves of the foreign-exchange special account, the Finance Ministry claims they are necessary to cover the losses incurred when the yen climbs against the dollar.
But the recent strong yen trend is casting doubt on whether the government can actually tap into those reserves.
Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa told the Diet earlier this month the government will incur about ¥19 trillion in unrealized losses on its foreign currency assets — the same amount it currently has in its reserves — if the yen climbs to 99 against the dollar.
Why have these special account reserves suddenly gained attention?
One reason is many feel a general election may be looming.
The U.S. financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September caused stock markets around the world to nosedive and weakened the global economy.
Japan didn't emerge unscathed, as the Tokyo Stock Exchange's Nikkei average plunged and the economy fell further toward recession.
Aso wants to impress voters with the economic stimulus packages. But the question is, how will he come up with the resources to finance them? This fiscal year's corporate tax revenues will inevitably decline, while social welfare costs continue to balloon.
Aso doesn't want to talk about raising the consumption tax before a general election and it may in any case be a few years before the government can actually hike the rate.
That is why politicians have suddenly started talking about buried funds.
A biography of the Ayatollah
Still a young boy at the time of his father's death, Khomeini's father Mostafa, as was customary in those days, trained for the family's religious profession. He studied first in a seminary in nearby Isfahan and then in Najaf and Samarra...
Mostafa seems to have ... lived the life of a landed provincial notable whose clerical background, wide-ranging connections in the region, and strong personality enabled him to become something of a community leader.
Inevitably, hagiographical accounts of Mostafa's character have, given the almost god-like status achieved by his youngest son and the lack of contemporary records, proliferated since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These tend to portray him as a man who came to be a popular and influential figure because he was "close to the ordinary people" and, unlike many clerics and chiefs "stood by the small farmers and peasants in their problems with the landlords and government officials."
There may well be an element of truth in such claims. But the noble qualities they attribute to a man of this period were of a different kind than those implied by the vocabulary of modern populist politics. The role of a man like Mostafa played in his community should be seen against the background of the lawlessness and insecurity that prevailed in many areas of provincial Iranian his day and the idealized function, in such circumstances, of the good "notable"...
But such a position carried its own dangers. On a cold day in March 1903, less than six months after the birth of his third son Ruhollah, Mostafa was shot and mortally wounded on the road from Khomein to Arak. He was only forty-seven-years old.
A number of imaginative stories have circulated since the 1979 revolution about this incident... An account that is undoubtedly closer to the truth... is that given by Morteza, who was only eight-years old at the time of his father's death, but, as his eldest male heir, was deeply involved in the events that followed it. It is worth paraphrasing ... for the vivid picture it provides of the society into which Khomeini was born.
In the second and third years of the twentieth century, life for the people of Khomein was, Morteza relates, made particularly miserable by three local khans - Bahran, Mirza Qoli Soltan and Ja'far Qoli - whose predatory ways oppressed the population. The worst of them was Bahram Khan, who was arrested and jailed by Heshmat al-Dowleh, a powerful Qajar prince who owned huge tracts of land in the region.
Bahram Khan was later killed or died in prison, but his two companions continued to harass the people. As the situation got worse, Mostafa decided that something must be done and that he would go to Arak to ask the provincial governor, the Shah's son Azod al-Saltaneh, for help...
He left for Arak, which was about two-day's journey from Khomein, with ten to fifteen horsemen and armed guards. The next day, as he was riding ahead of the party flanked by only two of his guards, Ja'far Khan and Mirza Qoli Soltan appeared on the roadside. They were unarmed.
"You were supposed to stay in Khomein," Mostafa said. "Well we didn't obey you," they replied. "They offered our father sweets and then suddenly seized a rifle [from one of the guards] and ... aimed at his heart. The bullet went clean through the Qo'ran my father had put in his shirt pocket and pierced his heart. He fell from his horse and died instantly." ...
Dilma participated in militant activities of Comando de Libertação Nacional (Colina, English: National Liberation Command,) and advocated Marxist politics among labour union members and as editor of the newspaper The Piquet. She reportedly knew how to handle weapons, confront the police, and use guerrilla tactics.
In early 1969, the Minas Gerais branch of Colina was limited to a dozen militants, with little money and few weapons. Its activities had boiled down to four bank robberies, some stolen cars and two bombings, with no casualties. On January 14, however, after the arrest of some militants during a bank robbery, the rest of them gathered to debate what they would do in order to release them from jail. At dawn, the police invaded the group's house and the militants responded by using a machine gun, which killed two policemen and wounded another.
Dilma and Galeno then began to sleep each night on a different location, since their apartment was visited by one of the leaders of the organization that had been arrested. They had to go back to their home secretly in order to destroy the organization's documents. On March 1969, the apartment was invaded by the police, but no document was found. They stayed in Belo Horizonte for a few more weeks trying to reorganize what was left of Colina, but had to avoid their parents' houses, aware that they were being watched by the military (Dilma's family had no knowledge of her participation on underground activities). In addition to that, Galeno had to undergo a facial plastical surgery or similar procedure (although he denies) after a sketch of him was released for participating on a bank robbery. Unable to remain on the city, the organization ordered them to move to Rio de Janeiro. Dilma was 21 and had just finished her fourth semester at the Minas Gerais Federal University Economics School.
The amount of people from Minas Gerais on the Rio de Janeiro faction of Colina was wide (including former Belo Horizonte mayor Fernando Pimentel, 18 years old at the time), with the organization having no infrastructure to shelter all of them. Dilma and Galeno stayed for a brief period in the house of an aunt of Dilma, which thought that the couple was in Rio on vacation. Later they moved to a small hotel and then to an apartment, until Galeno was sent by the organization to Porto Alegre. Dilma remained in Rio, where she helped the organization, attending meetings and transporting weapons and money. At one of these meetings, she met the Rio Grande do Sul-born lawyer Carlos Franklin Paixão de Araújo, who was then 31 years old; they developed a sudden crush for each other. Araújo was head of a dissent group of the Brazilian Communist Party (Portuguese: Partido Comunista Brasileiro - PCB) and sheltered Galeano in Porto Alegre. The break up with Galeno was peaceful. As Galeano said, "in that difficult situation, we had no perspective of forming a regular couple."
Araújo was the son of a prominent labor defense lawyer and had joined the PCB early. He had traveled through Latin America (having met Castro and Che Guevara) and had been imprisoned for several months in 1964. He joined the armed struggle after the issue of AI-5 by the dictatorship in 1968. On early 1969, he began to discuss the merger of his group with Colina and Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Portuguese: Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária - VPR), led by Carlos Lamarca. Dilma attended some meetings about the merger, which was formalized in two conferences in Mongaguá, leading to the creation of Revolutionary Armed Vanguard Palmares (Portuguese: Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares - VAR Palmares). Dilma and Araújo attended these conferences, as well as Lamarca, which thought that Dilma was a "stuck-up intellectual." His perception was based on her defense of a revolution through the political engagement of the working class, in opposition to VPR's military-based sense of revolution.
ジルマは「民族解放司令部」（Comando de Libertação Nacional）の武装活動組織に入り、労働組合のメンバーにマルクス主義を浸透させ、ピケという新聞も発行した。報道によると、ジルマは武器の扱い方、警察との対処方法やゲリラ戦術を心得ていた。
The Reality of Brasília
Brasília was a failure in many ways. The city did not turn out the way the planners intended and is not thought of very highly by either its own inhabitants or other Brazilians. The construction of the city produced a debt of over 2 billion dollars. Massive inflation in the 1960's, fueled by the proliferation of paper money, gave the military a good reason to take over the government and ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985.
Many of Costa's ideas for the Pilot Plan were failures from the beginning. They may have been good ideas in theory, but in reality they could never work. There has been a recent gentrification in much of the Pilot Plan, putting the housing there even further out of reach of the common worker than before. The superblocks, intended to be small communities in themselves, foster almost none of the community Costa and Niemeyer intended. The complaints against the buildings themselves is that there is no individuality to them, and that the apartments themselves are unchangeable.
There is very little casual social interaction in the Pilot Plan. There are no convenient meeting places, therefore people must arrange for meetings in their own homes, a very undesirable location for both parties involved. The Pilot Plan was built for the unrestricted movement of the automobile, therefore it is without street corners. The traditional street corner society is dead and there are no urban crowds in Brasília. New residents in the city are easily disoriented because of the lack of visual cues with which to navigate about the city with. Trying to find a particular address can be difficult because so much of the city looks the same.
Costa had intended the intersection of the two axis to have an area which would be much like the streets of Venice, with pedestrians strolling about and vendors hawking their goods. Kubitschek was in such a hurry to build Brasilia that this intimate part of the Plan was ommitted in the construction of the city, taking away any hopes of a truly pedestrian area in Brasília.
Brasília was a city built for the car, not the pedestrian. Accident rate in the Pilot Plan are five times higher than rates in North America. There are few opportunities for people to walk anywhere because the city has only superhighways. Crossing these highways is especially dangerous for the pedestrian. Although there are some underground crosswalks, they are poorly lit and a haven for muggers. It is estimated that at least one person a week is struck and killed attempting to cross a highway(Wright and Turkienicz, 1988).
A major complaint among residents of the Pilot Plan is that they have only home and work. There are no centralized meeting places for leisure time. The city is very divided into sectors, and there are almost no multi-use areas. There are sectors for everything, like embassies, police departments, fire departments, government car repair shops, private car repair shops, sports facilities, warehouses, military activities, clubs, schools and churches. Travel between these sectors can be very difficult, especially for a pedestrian. Most government buildings have their own shops and restaurants, but, because of the nature of the city, if a service is not available in the building, it could be several miles away. This strict division of the city discourages the casual errand, making the city a difficult place to live in.
There have been some attempts to make Brasília a more congenial city. Vendors often travel around with carts or bikes, selling their goods in superblocks and other areas, but this helps only a small bit in the attempt to make Brasília a nicer place to live.
Brasília is widely known as the "three day city" (Brunn and Williams, 1993), as many of its wealthier workers spend only Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday working in Brasília, and then jet to the more social cities like Rio and Sao Paulo for extended weekends. This only furthers the view of Brasília as an unpopular city. For one Brazilian's critique of Brasília, click here.
Brasília was a success on two fronts. Firstly, the construction of the city unified Brazil and provided Brazilians with a source of pride and a symbol of hope. The speed necessary to construct the city in the short amount of time allowed focused the countrys energy and showed Brazilians what they were capable of. There now seems to be a shift from Brasília being the core of the Federal District to it becoming more of the symbolic capital city it was intended to be as the satellite towns grow more and more self-sufficient of the Pilot Plan(Wright and Turkienicz, 1988). Soon, Brasília might become a suburb of the satellite towns it spawned. Secondly, Brasília's location was an even greater success. The city not only connected the rest of the country together with it's central location and superb highwy network, but it provided a growth center for Brazil to expand westward and to tap it's vast interior resources.
Overall, Brasília was a failure. Perhaps the greatest criticism of Brasília is that it is a culturally inappropriate city. Brasília is based upon European ideas, not Brazilian ones. Brasília was built for the automobile in a society where the automobile is still a status symbol. The social disparities clearly evident in Brazilian society are much to great for any idealistic city to overcome. The modernist view that an ideal city would produce an ideal society is clearly objectional, the modernist view did not take into account the human aspect a city, and therefore failed. To quote Paul Forster in "Capital of Dreams", "Perhaps if they had taken note of Frank Lloyd Wright, who wrote in 1932 that 'Architectural values are human values or they are not valuable', the city would be more suitable for pleasant living rather than efficient working."(Forster, 1986).
Okinawa the Root--Emigration to the South America
Tracing the Root of Okinawan emigrants
The beginning of actual emigration started in 1885, when people in mainland Japan move to Hawaii. In 1900-approximately 15 years from the initial Japanese migration, 26 Okinawan people traveled to Hawaii as migrant labors for the sugarcane fields. This is considered to be the root of 340,000 Okinawan emigrants although there were a few Okinawans who went to the United States on the same purpose before 1900.
Summary of emigration prior to WWII
The second emigration to Hawaii from Okinawa took place three years later in 1903 and 40 people were sent there as agricultural free emigrants. The emigrants to Hawaii increased in 1904 and the departure to Mexico and Philippine also started this year. The first emigration to the South America began with Peru in 1906 and Brazil two years later. The large portion of colonists was to Hawaii and the total number of Okinawan migrants was recorded as 4,670 in 1906. The emigration to all over the world had continued and there are more Japanese expatriates before WWII than in the postwar era-especially between the Taisho era (1912-1925) and in the 10s of the Showa era (1936-1943). About 75% of migration from Okinawa lives in the South America. According to the emigration statistics, there are 72,227 Okinawans moved to overseas prior to the Second World War, between 1899 and 1941. It is 11% of all the Japanese emigration-the total number of Japanese colonists is 655,661 during that period, and is the second largest prefecture sending its people to overseas, following Hiroshima prefecture. 96,848 people from Hiroshima traveled to overseas-14.8% of the Japanese emigration during that time period. Okinawans stayed and lived overseas at 1940 accounted 9.97% of resident population of their new home. It is incomparably higher than that of mainland Japanese (1.03%)-9.68% times larger than them. There are six prefectures that are considered to be largest ones sending its people to other countries including Okinawa and Hiroshima (3.88% of the resident population-Kumamoto (that of 4.78%), Yamaguchi (that of 3.23%), Wakayama (that of 2.57%) and Saga (that of 2.08%). One out of ten Okinawans moved to overseas as compared to one out of a hundred in mainland Japan.
Most Okinawan emigrants came from mainland Okinawa as well as other islands. Those who moved to Hawaii for the first and the second emigrations were mostly from Kin. The emigration phenomenon moved to Chubu and Shimajiri counties, shifted back to Kunigami county, and then to smaller islands. Very few left for Hawaii and the South America from Miyako and Yaeyama islands although many emigrated to Taiwan and southeastern islands.
Causes of Emigration
The most essential factor for Okinawan emigration is financial-economic migration and money making. However, other social factors such as the employment of a new land law following the abolition of allocation system, existence of pioneers of emigration and military draft avoidance, also had a great impact on the movement. Moreover, a personal motivation of emigration and interests of entry of new life in a different country sparked them. All the circumstances mentioned above functioned intricately.
Regions of Emigration
Okinawans residing Brazil at 1940 consisted of 28.4% (16,287 people) of those who moved to overseas (the total number was 57,283). 23% of them (13,146) started living in Hawaii, 18.7% (10,717) in Peru and 17.3% (9,899) in Philippine islands. 87.4% of emigrants from Okinawa dwelled in these four countries/regions. Okinawans moved to 23 different areas including Argentina, Malaysia, China, and mainland U.S. There were 60,000 Okinawans living in the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia, 20,000 in Taiwan, 2,000 in Manchuria during Japanese occupation before WWII. There were also quite a few Okinawans resided in Korea, Sakhalin and Guandong.
Okinawan Oversea Societies
Articles regarding Okinawan emigrants on newspapers in Okinawa are unique to mainland Japan. It means that Okinawa as a prefecture has strong bond with Issei, Nisei, and Sansei and that emigrant phenomenon have enormous news values to the media. The advance of globalization, the improvement of internationalized and information society is not foreign to us any more. It is possible to know overseas Okinawan societies and their cultures, and there are more opportunities to interact with them. Emigrants are the pioneers of international exchange and contribution, and play major roles oversea communities. It is not exaggerated to say that they are private sector diplomats.
Being emigrants from an underdeveloped prefecture, they overcame a number of hardships and worked very hard to improve their life and enjoy their children-fs and grandchildren-fs development. There are a lot of Issei migrants who are accepted as dedicated citizens of good faith and hard work in their new home, enjoy longevity and have a fulfilling life. They helped Okinaw-fs economic devealopment through money transfer before WWII. During the distressing postwar years, those who moved overseas offered their help to their war-damaged motherland.
Nikkeijin in the South America
There are approximately 2.7 million Nikkeijin around the world and most of them live in the North and the South Americas. The largest group among them live in Brazil (1.5 million)-followed by 90,000 in Peru, 50,000 in Argentina, 20,000 in Bolivia and 10,000 in Paraguay. 1.67 million live in these five countries and it represents 62% of Nikkeijin throughout the world. The estimated Okinawans live in Brazil are 150,000 (10% of Nikkeijin in the region), 63,000 in Peru (70%), 35,000 in Argentina (70%) 12,000 in Bolivia (60%) and 100 in Paraguay (1%).
Japan Policy Research Institute
Japanese immigrants in Brazil were in the dark as to accurate information on the war, with no newspapers to read (most of them could not read Portuguese), and few radios at hand (most had been confiscated). Fabricated "news" of Japan's winning battles escalated, ironically, as the major cities in Japan suffered air-raids and particularly after the battle in Okinawa ended with a disastrous loss for Japan. Such false information was circulated through word of mouth and mysterious leaflets. Pressure on Japanese immigrants to remain loyal subjects of the emperor created a frame of mind that caused the immigrants to "interpret" the news from Brazilian media (hence on the U.S. side) and to sift the "truth" out of it. Maeyama Takashi, one of Japan's leading scholars of Brazilian Japanese, observes that the Japanese immigrants selectively accepted the information that suited their symbolic structure and rejected as false that which did not. In this process, the falsehood was accepted as "news" and news was cast out as being "false," involving each immigrant as a coauthor of the falsehood. The report on Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers on radio and Brazilian newspapers of August 15, 1945, was thus "interpreted" as Americans manipulating the fact of Japan's victory into Japan's defeat. An avalanche of "news" followed that "confirmed Japan's victory." By August 17, however, news from Brazilian newspapers and radios convinced some Japanese of their homeland's defeat. These Japanese made rational judgments of the information they received, but their judgment did not prevail over the emotional responses of other immigrants. Those who acknowledged Japan's defeat came to be called the makegumi (defeat faction) or ninshikiha (acknowledging school). Diametrically opposed to them were kachigumi (victory faction) or kyokoha (hardheaded school).
Numerous kachigumi groups were formed, many of which were led by Shindo Renmei. They spread more false reports, allegedly from Japan, on the postwar situation after Japan's victory. The source of such "reports" was often the shortwave radio of a member of Shindo Renmei. But the shortwave radio "had bad reception" and some people doubted the credibility of any news received by it. To such skeptics, Shindo Renmei retorted, "Only the true Japanese with Japanese spirit can hear the correct messages from Japan" or "You can hear it if you listen with Japanese spirit." The aim of such arguments is clear: to purge any opposition by manipulating the shared identity based on the same value system. Soon, Shindo Renmei turned to exploiting the anxiety of the immigrants to reap financial gain. They solicited donations for their activities, sold fraudulent tickets for the return journey to Japan, and also sold fictitious real estate in the Philippines and Java as sites of reemigration. By telling immigrants what they wanted to hear, Shindo Renmei rapidly gained influence over them. In April 1946, Shindo Renmei was at its peak, with about 80 branches, claiming over a hundred thousand members. Its influence reportedly reached 90 percent of Japanese immigrants. It also carried out terrorist activities against their opposition, namely the makegumi, resulting in sixteen assassinations and ultimately leading to the arrest of Shindo Renmei leaders and the disbanding of the organization.
The dissolution of Shindo Renmei did not invalidate the kachigumi people's faith in Japan, though their faith no longer included a belief in Japan's victory. Most kachigumi people gradually accepted Japan's defeat as fact, although it took many almost a decade to do so. It took some even longer to come to terms with the fact. Halfway around the world from home, scattered in the Brazilian hinterland, living and working among themselves with little communication with the world outside their self-contained communities, Japanese immigrants held onto any thin thread that made them feel connected with their homeland to which they hoped to return some day. Rumors, particularly those that were favorable to Japan, were easily believed under those conditions. Many immigrants continued to believe in the perpetuation of the Japanese spirit, and even though Shindo Renmei was disbanded, kachigumi followers observed rituals as the emperor's subjects at home or within themselves.
The kachigumi followers were led to believe that they would receive free tickets home to Japan as long as they remained "true Japanese"--that is, as long as they adhered to and maintained the "Japanese spirit." One case, almost too bizarre for words, is described by Takagi Toshiro, who stumbled across the legacy of the kachigumi during his visit in Brazil in the 1960s and has written the most vivid account on this group. In the postscript of his book, Kyoshin--Burajiru Nikkei-imin no soran (Fanatics--Disturbances by Japanese-Brazilians), Takagi describes the November 1972 Japanese homecoming of the Hamahiga, Higa, and Maeda families, all kachigumi members. No sooner had they landed in Tokyo than the oldest, Hamahiga Ryoki, age 81, took his hat off, threw his arms up in the air, and exclaimed, "Long Live His Majesty! Long Live Japan!" ("Tennoheika banzai! Nippon banzai!"). It was his first return trip to Japan since he had left his home in Okinawa in 1920. He was so completely convinced of Japan's victory in the war that everything he saw in Japan--the new prosperity, the emperor still living in the Imperial Palace, and so on--appeared to him as proof of Japan's victory. He was accompanied by his wife, age 71, and their grandson, age 37. The other two families, Higa and Maeda, had eleven members in all, ranging in age from 13 to 65. At Yasukuni Shrine, they were overcome with emotions and wept.
These three families had lived close together in Brazil. Every morning, all the members would gather at the Higa family's home and conduct a daily ceremony. They would stand in neat rows in front of the family altar shelf with a purple curtain, bow to the picture of the emperor and the empress on the altar, and sing Kimigayo, the Japanese national anthem. Then, Hamahiga's grandson would recite the Imperial Rescript on Education, not knowing that it had been abolished in 1948. Takagi points out that public schools in Japan had conducted a similar ceremony since the Meiji era, but only on imperial holidays. The three families kept up this ceremony together every day for almost thirty years in Brazil. There were other family groups at the time that were conducting similar ceremonies every day. They believed that by doing so, they would prove themselves to be "true Japanese" and be rewarded with a free return journey home.
The Hamahiga and Higa families did get their airfare paid by the Japanese government, but not a reward for being loyal subjects of the Japanese empire. It was, instead, government aid to impoverished Japanese families overseas. Since such aid was not forthcoming to the Maeda family, they sold their land in order to raise money for the trip home. It is ironic that these families' home, Okinawa, had been occupied by the United States, the victor of the Pacific War, until May 1972, and that only after Okinawa's reversion to Japan could they return there. It is particularly ironic for the Maeda family, whose family house in Kin stands directly in front of the United States Marine Corps Base, Camp Hansen.
Japan made Commander of the Air Force Hosni Mubarak into a hero.
Hosni Mubarak helped plan a successful surprise attack on Israeli forces occupying the east bank of the Suez Canal, launching the Yom Kippur War on October 6, 1973. President Sadat named Mubarak vice president in 1975. It was September 11, 1973 according to the Japansese calendar.
But, in Chile, a coup headed by General Augusto Pinochet toppled the democratically elected president Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. Pinochet remained in power for almost 17 years.
Both of them were probably Japanese.
When Pinochet died on December 10, 2000, Hirokazu Nakaima was elected governor of Okinawa Prefecture in Japan.
Mubarak's right hand, Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces Mohamed Hussein Tantawi is probably Japanese. Tantawi shares the same birthday (October 31, 1935) with a popular Japanese actress, Yuko Hama.
The day is particularly auspicious for the Tokugawa samurai clan. The day is Tokugawa Ienari's birthday. He was the eleventh and longest serving shogun of the Tokugawa shogunate of Japan who held office from 1787 to 1837.
Egyptian flag is the symbol of Japanese oppression.
The red and white colors insinuate the Japanese rising sun flag. And the black color is the symbol of oppression.
Deadly magnitude 7.4 aftershock rocks northeast Japan
Mainichi Daily News April 8, 2011
A magnitude 7.4 earthquake shook northeast Japan late on April 7, leaving three people dead, in one of the largest aftershocks since a magnitude 9.0 quake and tsunami wreaked havoc on the region.
The tremor -- which registered a strong 6 in Sendai and a strong 5 in Morioka on the Japanese scale -- rekindled anxiety among the already quake-shocked population and dealt a blow to recovery operations. "It shook terribly, just like it did that time," one local said, comparing the late-night temblor to the March 11 disaster.
Typhoon Intimidation Again
As soon as I began to edit a new page in this site "Japan's Conspiracy", entitled with "Japan is an ancient Egypt dynasty" in Japanese, a typhoon developed, gained strength and moved toward to Kagoshima, where I live.
The content is a really surprising revelation. I am going to translate it into English, but unfortunately new revelations come out one after another and I don't have enough time to translate them into English.
I hope that you will understand my Japanese page through online translation systems.
In any case, I have been intimidated by typhoons at the time of new edition on critical conspiracy. It is almost impossible to explain the coincidences from the point of natural phenomenon. It can't be denied that the typhoons are artificially created by the Japanese government.
Typhoon Ma-on headed towards Japan // Globe has 7th warmest June on record
Surfersvillage Global Surf News, 16 July, 2011
Japan's Conspiracy ＞
Japanese Defense Minister Thanks Reagan Crew
U.S. Department of Defense April 4, 2011
Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa today boarded the USS Ronald Reagan to thank U.S. service members for their help since a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the tsunami it caused struck Japan on March 11.
The work of U.S. service members and other Americans is a testament to the half century of tomodachi –- friendship -- between the United States and Japan, Kitazawa said as he shared a statement from Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
“To all U.S. military members, on behalf of the people of Japan, I sincerely express my deep appreciation for the tremendous support provided by the U.S. military, the U.S. government and the American people at a time of unprecedented crisis in Japan,” Kitazawa said.
The USS Ronald Reagan responded immediately after the disaster, and its sailors, as well as other service members, continue their humanitarian mission in Japan “with pride and passion” and “are supporting Japan on an extraordinary scale,” he said.
As of March 25, more than 1,000 sailors and Marines were deployed in support of Operation Tomodachi and had flown more than 450 missions for recovery, transport and supplies distribution, according to the U.S. embassy officials in Tokyo.
Kitazawa said he received a call from President Barack Obama right after the earthquake, pledging American support.
“The entire Japanese people are deeply moved and encouraged by scenes of U.S. military members working hard in support of relief efforts,” he said. “Those in Japan and the United States are true tomodachi. … They share basic values such as democracy and respect for human rights.”
Faced with such a disaster, Kitazawa said, “in no time like the present do I feel so strongly about our friendship with the United States. Your support is a testament of our enduring bond for more than half a century. Japan, with your continuous cooperation, is determined to launch a full-scale effort to overcome these challenges ahead of us.”
U.S. Ambassador to Japan John V. Roos was part of the delegation that included senior Japanese military officials aboard USS Ronald Reagan today.
“Looking out over this spectacular view, in front of all you great Americans, I am awed to be here, and I can’t tell you how deeply moved I am by all you’ve accomplished in the last several weeks,” he said.
Roos offered U.S. condolences to the Japanese, noting that he saw the disaster’s effects firsthand in northeastern Japan. “One cannot even begin to imagine the devastation until you witness it yourself,” he said, “and even then it’s hard to imagine.
“I met with people who lost almost everything in their lives, including their loved ones,” he continued. “I could not help but be moved by their calm dignity and resilient spirit.”
Japan's Conspiracy ＞